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Executive Summary
The difficulty of ratifying any future climate change agreement through the
Article II treaty process calls for an understanding of the scope of the President’s
independent power to enter into internationally binding commitments related to
climate change. This power is necessarily limited, but as this paper shows, the
President’s foreign affairs powers, together with authority derived from existing
treaty obligations and federal statutes, provide legal authority for the President to
enter executive agreements relating to measurement, reporting, and verification;
aviation emissions; cooperative research and development in science and
technology; and capacity-building for developing countries.

1
3
4
6
7
8
10
12
12
13
15
15
16
18
19
20

Expectations for comprehensive binding commitments at the upcoming fifteenth
Conference of the Parties under the United Nations’ Framework Convention on Climate Change
(“UNFCCC”) in Copenhagen have evaporated. President Obama recently expressed support for
a proposal that would have the nations convening at Copenhagen commit to a non-binding
agreement that would serve as a framework for future negotiations of a legally binding
agreement.
One stumbling block that has caused substantial delay in international climate
negotiations has been the reluctance of the United States, one of the largest greenhouse gas
(“GHG”) emitters in the world, to sign on to internationally binding commitments that are not in
conformity with domestic legislation. This wariness stems in large part from the Treaty Clause
of the U.S. Constitution, which requires a two-thirds vote of the Senate for treaty ratification,1
and from U.S. experience with the Senate’s repudiation of the 1997 Kyoto Protocol.2 Concern
about the Senate’s unwillingness to approve an international climate agreement supports an
approach that grounds an international agreement in existing domestic legislation. Even if
domestic legislation, passed with at least 60 votes in the Senate for cloture, was the basis of an
international agreement, however, genuine concern remains that the international agreement
would nevertheless fail to garner the 67 votes in the Senate required under the Article II Treaty
Clause process.
One question worth exploring, then, is the extent to which the President can bind the
nation internationally without the advice and consent of Senate. As this paper explains, an
international climate agreement can likely be submitted to both houses of Congress as an ex post
congressional-executive agreement for approval by a majority vote, rather than to the Senate as
an Article II treaty for approval by a two-thirds vote. For political reasons, however, the
likelihood of success in taking this ex post congressional-executive route may be slim. This
paper therefore identifies areas in which executive agreements – some that will require no
congressional action to take effect domestically and others that will require congressional
cooperation in the form of appropriations – might be entered into with strong legal authority.
The President likely cannot rely on his independent powers alone to enter into international
climate agreements, but his foreign affairs powers together with existing treaties and
congressional delegations do provide legal authority for entering into executive agreements
relating, at least, to measurement, reporting, and verification (“MRV”), aviation emissions,
cooperation in research and development of science and technology, and capacity-building for
developing countries.
I. Alternatives to the Article II treaty
Although the Treaty Clause dominates discussion on international instruments and the
term “treaty” under domestic law refers to agreements ratified with the “advice and consent” of
the Senate, internationally binding agreements are frequently made via three different types of
1

U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (The President “shall have power, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to
make treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur . . . .”).
2
The Byrd-Hagel resolution, which passed with a vote of 95-0, expressed the sense of the Senate that the United
States should not sign any protocol to the UNFCCC that would subject developed countries, but not developing
countries, to binding emissions limits. S. RES. 98, 105th Cong., 143 CONG. REC. S8138 (1997). See David Victor,
Plan B for Copenhagen, 461(17) NATURE 342, 343 (Sept. 2009) (noting that “[t]he diplomats preparing for
Copenhagen, especially from the United States, are keen not to repeat the mistake of promising what they can’t
deliver.”).
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executive agreements, none of which require a supermajority Senate vote. Indeed, the United
States is party to five times more executive agreements than treaties,3 and between 1939 and
1993, more than 90% of the international agreements concluded were executive agreements.4
Sole executive, or presidential executive, agreements are entered into by the President
alone under his independent constitutional powers.5 Sole executive agreements include
agreements that are not intended to be legally binding, like the one that may be made at
Copenhagen. Such explicitly non-binding agreements do not create legal obligations, either
internationally or domestically, and are not the focus of this paper, which will address those sole
executive agreements that are intended to create binding obligations.
The key unknown with respect to sole executive agreements is the precise scope of the
President’s independent foreign affairs powers – although there is consensus that these powers
are limited, the “limits are difficult to determine and to state.”6 The President is likely on
strongest legal footing in using his independent powers to enter agreements relating to the
military, to recognition of a foreign government, and to settle international claims.7 Sole
executive agreements outside of these areas – including in areas actually relevant to climate
change – are less strongly grounded in the President’s independent powers and would therefore
be more difficult to sustain against legal challenge. Even so, the President’s independent powers
can be quite powerful in the climate arena when exercised in conjunction with other authority, as
it is in the other forms of executive agreements.
Treaty executive agreements are entered into by the President alone pursuant to an
express authorization in or a reasonable inference from an existing Article II treaty.8 In these
agreements, the President derives authority from three sources: his power to enter into treaties;
his duty to “take care” that the laws, including treaties, are faithfully executed; and the Senate’s
consent in the pre-existing treaty.9 As discussed below, the UNFCCC and Convention on
International Civil Aviation are two existing Article II treaties that may provide support for an
executive agreement relating to climate change.
Congressional-executive agreements, dealing with any matter within the combined
powers of Congress and the President,10 are entered into by the President pursuant to legislation
authorizing such an agreement (ex ante congressional-executive agreements)11 or are
3

See United States Senate, http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Treaties.htm (“The
United States is currently a party to nearly nine hundred treaties and more than five thousand executive
agreements.”).
4
See S. Doc. 108-17, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 108th Cong., THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, ANALYSIS
AND INTERPRETATION (2002 ed.) 516-17 [hereinafter ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION], available at
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/constitution/browse2002.html#2002 (noting that “the executive agreement has surpassed
in number and perhaps in international influence the treaty . . .”).
5
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 303(4) (1987) [hereinafter
RESTATEMENT].
6
LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 222, 224 (2d ed. 1996) (“The reaches
of the President’s power to make executive agreements remain highly uncertain as a matter of constitutional law.”).
7
Id. at 221, 229.
8
RESTATEMENT, supra note 5, § 303(3); CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 106TH CONG., TREATIES AND OTHER
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS: THE ROLE THE UNITED STATES SENATE 86 (Comm. Print 2001) [hereinafter CRS].
9
HENKIN, supra note 6, at 498 n.167; CRS, supra note 8, at 87; see also Wilson v. Girard, 354 U.S. 524 (1957)
(giving effect to a treaty executive agreement entered into pursuant to a ratified treaty).
10
RESTATEMENT, supra note 5, § 303(2).
11
E.g., Int’l Dolphin Conservation Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-523, 106 Stat. 3425 (1992) (“An Act to amend the
Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972 to authorize the Secretary of State to enter into international agreements to
establish a global moratorium to prohibit harvesting of tuna through the use of purse seine nets . . .”).
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congressionally approved as a matter of domestic law after the agreement is negotiated (ex post
congressional-executive agreements).12 Ex ante congressional-executive agreements are likely
the most common of all the executive agreements, and as will be seen below, Congress has
already delegated substantial power to the President via authorizing legislation.13
A. The Possibility of an Ex Post Congressional-Executive Agreement
With respect to ex post congressional-executive agreements, a central question is whether
the President can submit a climate agreement to both houses of Congress for majority approval
as an ex post congressional-executive agreement14 rather than to the Senate as an Article II
treaty.15 As a matter of law, the President can likely submit an agreement as either a
congressional-executive agreement or an Article II treaty, because the two are regarded as legally
interchangeable in nearly all instances.16 Even a recent critique of interchangeability concludes
that congressional-executive agreements can replace treaties in virtually all instances, except in
those rare cases where an agreement exceeds the sum of the respective powers of Congress and
the President, including in the cession of territory, extradition, and disabilities of aliens.17
As a matter of practice, ex post congressional-executive agreements have not entirely
replaced the treaty for political reasons, however.18 The determination of whether to submit an
international agreement to both houses of Congress for majority approval or to the Senate for a
two-thirds vote is “a political judgment, made in the first instance by the President, subject to the
possibility that the Senate might refuse to consider a joint resolution of Congress to approve an
12

E.g., An Act to provide congressional approval of the Governing International Fishery Agreement between the
United States and Japan, Pub. L. No. 100-220, 101 Stat. 1458 (1987) (“[T]he governing international fishery
agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Japan Concerning
Fisheries Off the Coasts of the United States, as contained in the message to Congress from the President of the
United States, dated November 17, 1987 is approved by Congress as a governing international fishery agreement . .
. and (2) shall enter into force and effect with respect to the United States on the date of the enactment of this Act.”).
13
See Oona A. Hathaway, Presidential Power over International Law: Restoring the Balance 15 (forthcoming
YALE L.J.) (exploring the “troubling reality” of the vast number of ex ante authorizations that relinquish Congress’s
power to the President).
14
Passage of an ex post congressional-executive agreement is subject to the same procedures as passage of federal
legislation generally, so in fact, the possibility of a filibuster in the Senate raises the majority vote to a 60 vote
requirement. See Oona A. Hathaway, Treaties’ End: The Past, Present, and Future of International Lawmaking in
the United States, 117 YALE L.J. 1236, 1311-12 (2008).
15
The State Department’s Office of Legal Adviser plays the key role in determining the form of an international
agreement by reference to the Circular 175 procedure, which identifies eight factors to be considered in deciding
what form an international agreement should take. See Dep’t of State Circular No. 175, Dec. 13, 1955, 22 C.F.R. §
181.4 (2007); Office of the Legal Adviser, Treaty Affairs, Circular 175 Procedure, at
http://www.state.gov/s/l/treaty/c175/; see also Hathaway, Treaties’ End, supra note 14, at 1249-52.
16
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT, supra note 5, § 303 cmt. e (“The prevailing view is that the Congressional-Executive
agreement can be used as an alternative to the treaty method in every instance.”); HENKIN, supra note 6, at 217
(noting that congressional-executive agreements are “available for wide use, even general use, and is a complete
alternative to a treaty: the President can seek approval of any agreement by joint resolution of both houses of
Congress rather than by two-thirds of the Senate”); CRS, supra note 8, at 86; Hathaway, Treaties’ End, supra note
14, at 1338 (“From a constitutional standpoint, nearly every agreement that can be entered through the Article II
treaty process can also be concluded by means of a congressional-executive agreement.”); Bruce Ackerman &
David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional, 108 HARV. L. REV. 801 (1995).
17
Hathaway, Treaties’ End, supra note 14, at 1338-45.
18
HENKIN, supra note 6, at 218.
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agreement, insisting that the President submit the agreement as a treaty.”19 Notably, the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee Report on the resolution of ratification for the UNFCCC noted the
Committee’s expectation that any future decision that would apply legally binding targets and
timetables for emissions reductions under the UNFCCC would require the Senate’s advice and
consent.20 Although not legally binding, this resolution strongly suggests that the Senate will
jealously guard its Article II prerogatives in ensuring that a future climate agreement is approved
under the Treaty Clause rather than as an ex post congressional-executive agreement.21
Although the President has the legal option of implementing an international climate
agreement as an ex post congressional-executive agreement, then, the success of this avenue will
turn on political considerations. This paper therefore focuses on sole executive, treaty executive,
and ex ante congressional-executive agreements (referring to them collectively as executive
agreements) as instruments that can in some instances take effect domestically without
congressional action.
B. A Note on the Binding Nature of Executive Agreements
Notwithstanding the distinction between the sole executive, treaty executive, and ex ante
congressional-executive agreements, the line between these various types of executive
agreements is not always clear.22 All three take effect solely upon the President’s action,23 and
all three rely on the President’s foreign affairs power. Yet, while the President’s independent
foreign affairs power is the only legal authority for sole executive agreements, treaty executive
agreements have the additional authority arising from an Article II treaty obligation, and ex ante
congressional-executive agreements have the additional authority of a congressional
delegation.24
Another difference lies in these agreements’ effects on domestic law. All override
inconsistent state law.25 Treaty executive agreements also supersede earlier inconsistent federal
law.26 Sole executive agreements, on the other hand, have no effect if contrary to earlier federal
legislation.27 The prevailing view is that ex ante congressional-executive agreements, like treaty
19

RESTATEMENT, supra note 5, § 303 cmt e; see also HENKIN, supra note 6, at 497 n.164 (identifying instances
where the Senate has objected to a particular agreement not being submitted as an Article II treaty).
20
S. Exec. Rep. 102-55, 102d Cong. (1992), at 14.
21
See also Nigel Purvis, The Case for Climate Protection Authority, 49 VA. INT’L L.J. 1007, 1049-50 (2009).
22
See Hathaway, Treaties’ End, supra note 14, at 1254. Executive agreements rarely identify the source of
authority under which the President acts. A non-treaty international agreement signed and entered into force on the
same day without any identifying source of authority is not necessarily a sole executive agreement. It may be an ex
ante congressional-executive agreement, for instance – the only way to tell is to search the Statutes at Large for
legislation that might have authorized the President to enter into that agreement. See generally id. at 1259 and
Appendix A.
23
See Hathaway, Presidential Power, supra note 13, at 14. Ex post congressional-executive agreements, on the
other hand, do not take effect without a majority vote in both houses of Congress.
24
Id.
25
See Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003) (sole executive agreement preempted state statute); Dames
& Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981) (same); RESTATEMENT, supra note 5, § 303 cmt. j. The court’s
interpretation of the preemptive effect of sole executive agreements on state law has been the subject of a great deal
of scholarly criticism. See Bradford R. Clark, Domesticating Sole Executive Agreements, 93 VA. L.R. 1573 (2007);
Michael P. Van Alstine, Executive Aggrandizement in Foreign Affairs Lawmaking, 54 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 309 (2006);
Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power over Foreign Affairs, 111 YALE L.J. 231 (2001).
26
RESTATEMENT, supra note 5, § 115 reporters’ n.5 & cmt. c.
27
See United States v. Guy W. Capps, Inc., 204 F.2d 655 (4th Cir. 1953). This modern understanding of the
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executive agreements, prevail in a conflict with earlier federal legislation, but this issue is not
settled.28 With respect to their relationship to later inconsistent federal law, all are subject to the
last-in-time rule, so that later inconsistent federal statutes are given primacy.29 In other words,
Congress can pass legislation that would invalidate an earlier executive agreement, reflecting the
importance of congressional support in any executive agreement entered by the President.
Regardless of these variations in their effect as domestic law, executive agreements are
recognized under international law as equally binding as Article II treaties.30 Popular notions of
a “binding” international instrument conflate the binding nature of the legal obligation with selfexecution. A self-executing treaty requires no new legislation to enable the United States to
carry out its obligations. Upon ratification, the treaty immediately takes effect as law of the
United States, supreme over state law and judicially enforceable.31 On the other hand, a nonself-executing treaty requires domestic law to give effect to its terms and cannot be enforced by
the courts (although courts can enforce the implementing legislation once it is enacted).32 In
other words, whereas a self-executing treaty is “itself law,” a non-self-executing treaty is a
binding “promis[e] to enact law.”33 The same notions of execution apply in the context of nontreaty international agreements.34
A country may be bound as a matter of international law without being bound as a matter
of domestic law because international agreements are considered binding on parties when the
agreement enters into force, regardless of the nature of execution.35 In other words, whether an
international agreement is self-executing or not, it is legally binding on the United States as a
matter of international law, so that a failure to enact domestic legislation to implement a nonself-executing agreement renders the U.S. in default of its international obligations.36 For many,
inability of sole executive agreements to supersede earlier federal legislation has evolved over time. See, e.g.,
RESTATEMENT, supra note 5, § 303 cmt. j (noting in 1987 that the status of sole executive agreements in relation to
earlier Congressional legislation “has not been authoritatively determined”); HENKIN, supra note 6, at 228 (noting in
1996 that whether a sole executive agreement prevails in the face of earlier Congressional legislation remains
unresolved); ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION 93-95 (noting in 2002 that “courts have been reluctant to enforce [sole
executive] agreements in the face of prior congressional enactments,” but that “the law on this point may yet be in
the course of further development”); Derek Jinks & Neal Kumar Katyal, Disregarding Foreign Relations Law, 116
YALE L.J. 1230, 1244 (2007) (concluding in 2007 that courts have “consistently held that [sole executive
agreements] do not supersede inconsistent acts of Congress.”).
28
Compare RESTATEMENT, supra note 5, § 115 reporters’ n.5 & cmt. c (1987) with Hathaway, Presidential Power,
supra note 13, at 59-60 n.239.
29
RESTATEMENT, supra note 5, § 115; HENKIN, supra note 6, at 228.
30
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 2.1(a), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 311 (defining “treaty” as “an
international agreement concluded between States in written form and governed by international law, whether
embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular designation”); see
also Hathaway, Treaties’ End, supra note 14, at 1255; Myres S. MacDougal & Asher Lans, Treaties and
Congressional-Executive or Presidential Agreements: Interchangeable Instruments of National Policy, 54 YALE L.J.
181, 196 (1945).
31
RESTATEMENT, supra note 5, § 111, Introductory Note, at 41; § 111(3); Hathaway, Treaties’ End, supra note 14,
at 1318.
32
See RESTATEMENT, supra note 5, § 111, reporters’ n.5.
33
HENKIN, supra note 6, at 201.
34
See generally RESTATEMENT, supra note 5, § 111.
35
RESTATEMENT, supra note 5, § 111, cmt. h & reporters’ n.5; § 115(1); § 301 cmt. a (noting that terminology used
for international agreements is varied, and include treaty, convention, agreement, protocol, memorandum of
understanding, but that “[w]hatever their designation, all agreements have the same legal status, except as their
provisions or the circumstances of their conclusion indicate otherwise”); HENKIN, supra note 6, at 203.
36
See generally Hathaway, Treaties’ End, supra note 14, at 1317-19 (noting that to avoid placing the United States
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this reality means little. Discussions of enforceability have consequently focused on domestic
execution rather than international obligation under the belief that “[i]nternational law truly binds
only when there is a way to enforce a state's obligation under international law in domestic
courts”37 – in other words, if the international obligation is self-executing or when domestic
lawmaking implements a non-self-executing international obligation.
That the President has the power to create binding international obligations is noteworthy
in its own right, however, and should not be hastily dismissed. As will be discussed below,
where the President validly exercises his powers to create international obligations, these
obligations have been treated by the Supreme Court as self-executing, taking on the force of
domestic law noted above (superseding state law, and superseding earlier federal legislation
depending on the type of executive agreement).38 Thus, as executive agreements have evolved in
American jurisprudence, the distinct powers to (1) enter into an international obligation and (2)
implement the obligation with the force of domestic law have become deeply intertwined.39
Where the President enters an internationally binding agreement beyond his independent powers,
the agreements remain no less internationally binding, but is simply non-self-executing and
requires congressional action to implement.
C. The Youngstown Framework
Justice Jackson’s concurrence in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,40 delineating
three spheres of presidential power, is the framework within which to assess independent
presidential action. The President’s authority is “at its maximum” when he “acts pursuant to an
express or implied authorization of Congress, . . . for it includes all that he possesses in his own
right plus all that Congress can delegate.”41 Ex ante congressional-executive agreements fall
under this category.
When the President acts in the midst of congressional silence, “he can only rely upon his
own independent powers, but there is a zone of twilight in which he and Congress may have
concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain” and depends largely on prudential
concerns.42 The President’s power is “at its lowest ebb” when he “takes measures incompatible
with the expressed or implied will of Congress, . . . for then he can rely only upon his own
constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter.”43
Sole executive agreements fall under the “zone of twilight” in which the President acts
with congressional silence.44 Assessing the President’s authority to enter a sole executive
in violation of its international obligations for failing to enact necessary implementing legislation, the Senate usually
postpones its advice and consent to a non-self-executing treaty until implementing legislation can be enacted, or the
Senate might give its advice and consent contingent upon subsequent enactment of implementing legislation).
37
Id. at 1317.
38
See MacDougal & Lans, supra note 30, at 311 (“In both the Belmont and Pink cases it was squarely held that
agreements made under the President’s independent constitutional authority were binding on all courts under the
supremacy clause, and were superior to contrary state law or judicial doctrine, to the same extent as treaties.”).
39
See Michael D. Ramsey, Executive Agreements and the (Non)Treaty Power, 77 N.C. L. REV. 133, 143-44
(distinguishing between these two powers and criticizing the way in which the Supreme Court has conflated the two
in giving preemptive effect to sole executive agreements).
40
343 U.S. 579 (1952) (Jackson, J. concurring).
41
Id. at 635-36.
42
Id. at 637.
43
Id.
44
See RESTATEMENT, supra note 5, § 303 reporters’ notes 11; Curtis A. Bradley, Unratified Treaties, Domestic
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agreement therefore requires an analysis of the constitutional allocation of powers between the
President and Congress to determine whether an agreement truly rests on presidential power
alone.45 It is clear, for instance, that the President may not commit the United States to an
international agreement that would usurp powers constitutionally reserved for Congress, such as
appropriating funds or declaring war.46
If this seems contrary to the earlier explanation that the President may internationally
bind the nation to commitments that are non-self-executing, it is worth noting that a country may
invoke “manifest” violations of “a provision of its internal law regarding competence to
conclude treaties” as invalidating the consent necessary to establish an internationally binding
agreement.47 So, an executive agreement that clearly reaches beyond the President’s powers in
manifest violation of the separation of powers would violate U.S. “internal law” and therefore
arguably not be internationally binding upon the United States. To avoid this result, non-selfexecuting executive agreements are typically self-consciously so, containing provisions
indicating that their terms are subject to the availability of funds or domestic regulation.48 These
agreements do not purport to exercise powers the President lacks, and are internationally
binding, non-self-executing commitments.
II. The Scope of Presidential Power to Enter Executive Agreements
Presidents have “achieved and legitimated an undisputed, extensive, predominant, in
some respects exclusive, ‘foreign affairs power,’” but the scope and content of this power are
unclear.49 The power arises from the President’s enumerated Article II powers:50 (1) as chief
executive, (2) as Commander in Chief, (3) to receive ambassadors, (4) to make treaties with the
advice and consent of the Senate, and (5) to take care that the laws are faithfully implemented.51
Whatever the extent of these powers, one clear limit is that all executive agreements are subject
to the Constitution itself, and may not, for instance, violate the Bill of Rights.52
This Part traces the contours of each of the enumerated powers as a starting point for
understanding the scope of the President’s power to enter into executive agreements.53 As has
Politics, and the U.S. Constitution, 48 HARV. INT’L L.J. 307, 322 (2007).
45
See Hathaway, Presidential Power, supra note 13, at 58.
46
The Constitution grants Congress the federal spending power, U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 7-8, and the power to declare
war, id. art. I, § 8. See HENKIN, supra note 6, at 229; Hathaway, Presidential Power, supra note 13, at 58 (phrasing
the limitation on the President’s power to enter sole executive agreements as follows: “the President may not
commit the United States to an international agreement on his own if he would be unable to carry out the obligations
created by the agreement on his own in the absence of an agreement . . . . The President may not use a sole
executive agreement with another nation, in other words, to expand his powers beyond those granted to him in the
Constitution.”).
47
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 30, art. 46, § 1.
48
E.g., Agreement on Cooperation in Research and Development in Science and Technology Art. VIII, U.S.-Japan,
June 20, 1988, T.I.A.S. No. 12025 (“Implementation of this Agreement will be subject to the availability of
appropriated funds and to the applicable laws and regulations of each country.”).
49
HENKIN, supra note 6, at 41.
50
See CRS, supra note 8, 89-92; HENKIN, supra note 6, at 36-45.
51
U.S. CONST. art. II, §§ 1-3.
52
See Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 417 n.9; RESTATEMENT, supra note 5, § 111 cmt. a; § 302; MacDougal & Lans,
supra note 30, at 315-316.
53
The President’s Commander in Chief powers are unlikely to provide the basis for any sole executive agreement in
the climate change arena, so this paper will not explore the breadth of this power except to note that actual
Presidential practice over the decades has expanded substantially upon the narrow judicial acceptance of the
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been observed, however, the enumerated powers “do not seem to convey anything approaching
even the minimum powers everyone assumes the President to enjoy.”54 What power the
President does exercise – that is, the actual practice of executive agreements – will therefore be
explored as well, particularly in light of the modern Supreme Court emphasis on “the historical
gloss on the ‘executive Power’ vested in Article II of the Constitution.”55 This exploration
concludes that although amorphous, the President’s independent constitutional power alone is
unlikely to strongly support executive agreements relevant to climate change.
A. The President’s Enumerated Powers
The extent to which the President’s “take care” duty provides authority for executive
agreements is somewhat controversial.56 That the clause supports presidential authority to enter
treaty executive agreements to ensure faithful execution of treaties is generally accepted, but
there is a lack of clarity as to how far this duty extends. No case has ever held the “take care”
clause to be specific authority for sole executive agreements, although the Supreme Court has
suggested in dicta that the President’s responsibilities under this clause include the enforcement
of “rights, duties, and obligations growing out of” the country’s international relations.57
Scholarship generally fails to distinguish among the President’s authority to carry out
obligations under a treaty, the authority to exercise rights or pursue general policies established
by international law, the authority to domestically implement international agreements and law
other than treaties, and the authority to compel other states to carry out their international
obligations to the United States.58 The majority view takes an expansive reading of the
President’s authority to take care that international laws are faithfully executed and finds that the
clause sanctions agreements necessary to implement even non-self-executing treaties and to
fulfill international obligations more generally,59 but these conclusions are hotly contested by
critics.60
The treaty clause, together with the President’s general executive power, is grounds for
“ancillary authority to make agreements necessary for the conclusion of treaties,” such as
temporary measures pending the conclusion of a treaty.61 Watts v. United States, for instance,
upheld a sole executive agreement between the United States and Great Britain to jointly occupy
San Juan Island pending a final determination by the parties of the international boundary.62
Subsequent historical practice confirms that such provisional measures, intended to be replaced
by later more permanent and detailed arrangements, are an accepted form for sole executive

President’s authority to conclude sole executive agreements pursuant to this power.
54
Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 25, 111 YALE L.J. at 233.
55
539 U.S. at 414.
56
CRS, supra note 8, at 92; see Edward T. Swaine, Taking Care of Treaties, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 331, 359-60
(2008); Van Alstine, supra note 25.
57
In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1 (1890); see CRS, supra note 8, at 92.
58
See HENKIN, supra note 6, at 347 n.54.
59
See RESTATEMENT, supra note 5, § 111 cmt. c; HENKIN, supra note 6, at 203-04; Arthur S. Miller, The President
and Faithful Execution of the Laws, 40 VAND. L. REV. 389, 402-05 (1987); MacDougal & Lans, supra note 30, at
248.
60
See Swaine, supra note 56.
61
CRS, supra note 8, at 90-91; ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION, supra note 4, at 522; Ingrid Brunk Wuerth, The
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agreements.63
The President’s executive power, which enjoys no benefit of textual detail in the
Constitution,64 is the key source of vagueness, and hence potential breadth, in the President’s
foreign affairs powers. Found in Watts – likely the first judicial recognition of the executive
power in foreign affairs65 – merely to include the power to “make and enforce [] a temporary
convention respecting [] territory,” this amorphous executive power in foreign affairs was later
famously and broadly described in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp, as “the very
delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the President as the sole organ of the federal
government in the field of international relations.”66
The President’s authority as “sole organ” of communications in foreign affairs derives in
part from his power to receive ambassadors,67 which impliedly incorporates the more expansive
power to recognize (and accordingly, refuse to recognize, maintain or terminate relations with,
and express neutrality towards) foreign governments.68 This power as “sole organ” of
communications, which is relevant to the exchange and sharing of information in the context of
MRV and science and technology cooperation in climate change mitigation, has developed “well
beyond any penumbras that might emanate from the reception [i.e. recognition] power or the
power to make treaties.”69
The four Supreme Court cases that have upheld the constitutionality and preemptive
nature of sole executive agreements point to the President’s executive powers and his role as the
sole organ, but as the following discussion shows, these cases may not pave the way for as
expansive a presidential power to enter sole executive agreements having status as U.S. law as
many critics have assumed. In United States v. Belmont and United States v. Pink, the Court
found preemptive over state law a sole executive agreement in which the United States and
Soviet Union settled claims as part of the United States’ recognition of the Soviet Union and
establishment of normal diplomatic relations between the two countries.70 The Belmont Court
found that the President “had authority to speak as the sole organ” of the national government
and that his authority to enter a sole executive agreement that recognized another country,
established diplomatic relations, and settled claims “may not be doubted.”71 The Pink Court
confirmed, citing Curtiss-Wright in noting that “[p]ower to remove such obstacles to full
recognition as settlements of claims of our nationals certainly is a modest implied power of the
President who is the ‘sole organ of the federal government in the field of international
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relations.’”72
The Youngstown framework, which undermined Curtiss-Wright’s expansive view of
presidential power, was set forth after Belmont and Pink and before the next two cases on sole
executive agreements: Dames & Moore v. Regan73 and American Insurance Ass’n v.
Garamendi.74 These modern cases accordingly emphasized congressional acquiescence as an
important element bolstering the President’s authority to enter the executive agreements at issue.
In Dames & Moore, the Court found preemptive of state law a sole executive agreement that
resolved to settle claims between the United States and Iran as part of negotiations to resolve the
Iran hostage crisis.75 Relying only lightly on Belmont and Pink, the Court pointed to the
“longstanding practice” of settling claims of nationals against foreign countries by sole executive
agreement, and found “crucial” to its decision that Congress “implicitly approved the practice of
claim settlement by executive agreement.”76 Similarly, in Garamendi, the Court found a state
statute preempted by a sole executive agreement in which the federal government pledged to
discourage certain claims against German companies in American courts.77 The Court pointed to
Pink, Belmont, and Dames & Moore as recognition of presidential authority to enter sole
executive agreements, repeated recitations of the “longstanding practice” of claims settlement
through sole executive agreement, and concluded “that the President’s control of foreign
relations includes the settlement of claims is indisputable.”78
The Supreme Court has never found a sole executive agreement ultra vires, but neither
has it set forth in these four cases “principles or [] general guidance to define the President’s
power to act alone.”79 Read conservatively in the interest of assessing a strong legal foundation
for presidential action, these cases do not suggest that the President’s independent foreign affairs
power alone supports executive agreements in areas relevant to climate change. All four cases
addressed sole executive agreements regarding claims settlement specifically. Belmont and Pink,
decided before the modern Youngstown understanding of presidential power, relied not only on
the “sole organ” executive power described in Curtiss-Wright, but additionally on the
presidential power to recognize foreign governments.80 Dames & Moore and Garamendi move
away from Curtiss-Wright’s broad grant of inherent power in favor of the Youngstown
framework, and, critically, both rely on the historical practice of claims settlement through sole
executive agreement as evidence of congressional acquiescence elevating the sole executive
agreements at issue into the zone of greatest presidential power. This reliance on historical
practice as grounds for legality calls for a review of the practice in executive agreements.
B. Historical Practice
As noted by the Dames & Moore Court, a “systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long
pursued to the knowledge of the Congress and never before questioned . . . may be treated as a
gloss on ‘Executive Power’ vested in the President by § 1 of Art. II. Past practice does not, by
72
73
74
75
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77
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itself, create power, but long-continued practice, known to and acquiesced in by Congress, would
raise a presumption that the action had been taken in pursuance of its consent.”81 This section
therefore outlines the practice in executive agreements because, in effect, “in the area of foreign
affairs, prior practice by the executive branch is itself one measure of constitutionality.”82
Congressional-executive agreements make up the vast majority of executive agreements.
Between 1990 and 2000, roughly 80% of all executive agreements were ex ante congressionalexecutive agreements.83 Sole executive agreements, on the other hand, are relatively uncommon.
Between 1946 and 1972, only 5.5% of the international agreements entered by the United States
were based solely on the President’s authority.84 From the Founding until the early 1900s, only
two types of sole executive agreements were concluded, both grounded in the President’s
executive and Commander in Chief powers: claims settlements and temporary agreements.85 In
the twentieth century, sole executive agreements have been used most commonly in military and
foreign relations matters, ranging from minor formalities to more sweeping agreements, such as
the 1945 Yalta agreement regarding post-war political reorganization.86
The 1972 Case Act requires the President to report the text of any non-Article II
international agreement to Congress within 60 days of the agreement's entry into force.87 A
review of the State Department’s compilation of international agreements reported under the
Case Act (which includes all types of executive agreements) reveals the following most common
subjects of reported agreements from 1982 to 2008: military (27%), assistance mostly through
the U.S. Agency for International Development (18%), atomic energy and nuclear safety (9%),
aviation (6%), and scientific cooperation (6%).88 A more thorough empirical survey of executive
agreements that cross-references multiple databases, largely corroborates these findings.89
Professor Hathaway’s study reveals the following most common areas of executive agreements:
defense (14%), trade (9%), scientific cooperation (6%), postal matters (6%), and debts (6%).90
The prominence of executive agreements in aviation, cooperation in science and
technology, and development assistance is noteworthy for those interested in the climate change
context. That these agreements are all treaty executive or ex ante congressional-executive
agreements suggests that the President’s relevant foreign affairs powers – the executive power
and as sole organ of communication, together with the treaty power and duty to take care of the
laws – are necessary, but probably not sufficient, for a strong legal foundation to enter an
executive agreement relating to climate change. The authority conveyed by existing Article II
treaties and congressional authorizations will be important in providing support for such
agreements.
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III. Possible Grounds for Treaty-Executive Agreements
Having outlined the President’s power to enter executive agreements and finding them
likely insufficient to independently support executive agreements relevant to climate change, this
part and the next outline possible grounds for executive agreements that rely on the additional
legal support of Article II treaties and federal legislation. In reading these parts, it will be helpful
to bear in mind the distinct, but related, powers to enter an internationally binding executive
agreement and to execute that agreement domestically.
A. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
The UNFCCC, ratified by the U.S. Senate in October 1992 and entered into force in
March 1994, is the most obvious instrument to look to in ascertaining whether the President may
enter a treaty executive agreement pursuant to its existing treaty obligations. Although the
UNFCCC is not considered self-executing, it, along with the domestic legislation under which its
reporting requirements have been met, may support an executive agreement regarding MRV.
The U.S. is internationally bound by the Convention, but no new domestic legislation was
implemented after the UNFCCC’s ratification to give it domestic effect. As a ratified treaty, the
UNFCCC is supreme law of the land, but as a non-self-executing treaty, it cannot be judicially
enforced without implementing federal legislation.91 The single commentator that has analyzed
the issue in the climate change context has largely dismissed the UNFCCC because its non-selfexecuting nature means that although the President “may look to the treaty for authority to enter
into a new international obligation under the parent treaty,” the President may not “point to [the
UNFCCC] as authority to implement new executive agreements on climate change under
domestic law.”92
The UNFCCC should not be so lightly dismissed, however. The authority the treaty
lends to “enter into a new international obligation” is important. It can be relied on, together
with the President’s foreign affairs powers and his role as sole organ of communications between
the U.S. and the international community, as convincing legal authority to enter into an
executive agreement pursuant to UNFCCC obligations. As for execution, MRV is one area in
which domestic implementation of an international obligation under existing laws is possible.
The UNFCCC established a MRV framework for national communications that required
parties to develop, update, and report “national inventories of anthropogenic emissions . . . of all
greenhouse gases . . . , using comparable methodologies to be agreed upon by the Conference of
the Parties,” and a description of the country’s mitigation actions and plans to implement the
Convention.93 Specifically citing the requirements of Articles 4 and 12 of the UNFCCC, the
U.S. has regularly submitted Climate Action Reports that include the requisite GHG inventory
and description of U.S. mitigation actions.94 The U.S. has also complied with revised technical
methodologies and guidelines adopted in subsequent UNFCCC meetings.95
91

See HENKIN, supra note 6, at 203.
Purvis, supra note 20, at 1048-49.
93
U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change arts. 4, 12, May 9, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 164.
94
E.g., Dep’t of State, Fourth Climate Action Report to the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change (July
2007), available at http://www.state.gov/g/oes/rls/rpts/car/.
95
See id. at 18 (noting that the greenhouse gas inventory was calculated using methodologies consistent with those
recommended by the IPCC and the IPCC good practice guidances, and that the structure of the inventory is
consistent with UNFCCC reporting guidelines); Dep’t of State Notice, Preparation of Second U.S. Climate Action
92

12

U.S. compliance with the UNFCCC’s reporting obligations, despite the non-selfexecuting nature of the treaty, suggests that existing domestic legislation was adequate to
implement these obligations. Congressional drafting of the Energy Policy Act of 1992
overlapped with UNFCCC negotiations, and provisions of the Act refer to the UNFCCC and
provide for certain actions to be taken pending its ratification.96 With respect to reporting, the
Act ordered the Energy Information Administration in consultation with the Environmental
Protection Agency to develop an inventory of GHG emissions, and to annually update and
analyze the inventory using available data.97 The Act also mandated the preparation of a lowcost energy strategy that would achieve, among other things, “stabilization and eventual
reduction in the generation of greenhouse gases.”98
The Act was signed into law on October 24, 1992, shortly after the Senate’s October 7
ratification of the UNFCCC. No legislation was enacted to execute the UNFCCC presumably in
part because the Energy Policy Act already authorized actions appropriate for implementing the
UNFCCC’s reporting requirements. Therefore, to the extent provisions of the Energy Policy Act
have been construed as domestic authorization for the UNFCCC’s reporting requirements, the
Act may also be a means for domestic implementation of an international agreement crafting a
more robust MRV system.99
B. The Convention on International Civil Aviation
A sectoral approach to emissions reductions would implement targets or harmonized
standards for specific sectors as a supplement to nationally binding economy-wide emissions
targets.100 Aviation is one sector in which the President can probably enter an executive
agreement committing the country to such emissions reduction measures.
A majority of the international agreements in the aviation sector are treaty executive
agreements entered pursuant to Article II treaties on air safety and transport.101 Most notably,
Report, 62 Fed. Reg. 25988-03 (May 12, 1997) (noting compliance with the revised methodologies to inventory
greenhouse gas emissions approved by the UNFCCC’s Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice).
96
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the U.S. signed and ratified the Convention on International Civil Aviation (“Aviation
Convention”), which entered into force on April 4, 1947 and established the International Civil
Aviation Organization (“ICAO”) as an U.N. agency for the coordination and regulation of
international air travel.102 Parties to the Convention agreed to “collaborate in securing the
highest practicable degree of uniformity in regulations, standards, procedures, and organization
in relation to aircraft, standards, procedures . . . .”103
Multiple treaty executive agreements have been entered pursuant to the Aviation
Convention, its annexes, and ICAO resolutions.104 For instance, the U.S., Canada, and Australia
cited an ICAO resolution urging members to ban smoking on international passenger flights in
signing an executive agreement in which the three countries agreed to prohibit smoking on all
passenger flights between their territories.105 At the level of domestic implementation, federal
agencies, principally the Federal Aviation Administration, have routinely promulgated
regulations pursuant to U.S. international obligations to harmonize domestic standards with the
international standards issued by ICAO.106
The ICAO’s Committee on Aircraft Engine Emissions is charged with developing
specific standards for emissions. The Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”), which has
authority under the Clean Air Act to “issue proposed emission standards applicable to the
emission of any air pollutant from any class or classes of aircraft engines which in [its] judgment
causes, or contributes to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public
health or welfare,”107 has relied on this authority to harmonize U.S. aviation emissions standards
with ICAO standards. In initiating a rulemaking in one instance, the EPA noted:
On June 30, 1981, the ICAO issued engine emission standards which apply to
many (but not all) of the same types of engines to which the U.S. standards apply.
With the establishment of the international standards, the U.S. now has an
obligation [footnote: Based on the Chicago Convention on International Aviation
December 7, 1944, to which the United States is one of the signatory nations] to
frame national standards to be as compatible as possible with the ICAO standards,
consistent with U.S. environmental goals and with EPA's responsibilities under
Section 231 of the Clean Air Act.”108
The status of the Convention on International Civil Aviation as an Article II treaty and
the practice of entering executive agreements pursuant to this treaty, which are then domestically
implemented by agencies with existing authority, provide fairly safe legal grounds for the
102
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President in the aviation sector. It would be well within precedent for the President, pursuant to
U.S. obligations under the Aviation Convention, to internationally bind the U.S. to aviation
emissions standards and for the EPA, pursuant to its Clean Air Act authority, to regulate based
on this obligation.
IV. Possible Grounds for Ex Ante Congressional-Executive Agreements
Several pieces of legislation may give the President authority to enter congressionalexecutive agreements to cooperate in technology and research and to provide assistance for
development. Together with the President’s foreign affairs powers, such authorization should
provide strong legal authority for entering into executive agreements, although in some
instances, these agreements will require congressional cooperation to implement.
A. The Clean Air Act
The Clean Air Act (“CAA”) likely does not delegate any authority to the President to
enter international agreements relating to climate change, although the EPA’s existing authority
under the CAA is an avenue for domestic implementation of an executive agreement properly
entered under other authority.
Title VI of the CAA, which was added after the U.S. ratification of the 1987 Montreal
Protocol to phase out the use of ozone-depleting substances,109 authorizes the President to
“undertake to enter into international agreements to foster cooperative research . . . and to
develop standards and regulations which protect the stratosphere consistent with the regulations
applicable within the United States.”110 It is clear from the structure and language of the CAA
that Congress intended Title VI for protection of the stratosphere in the context of the ozone
layer problem addressed by the Montreal Protocol. Accordingly, any attempt to enter into a
climate change executive agreement citing authorization under this section would rest on weak
legal ground.111
The Title VI language aside, there has been some suggestion that because EPA now has
authority to regulate greenhouse gases under the CAA,112 the President may exercise his duty to
“take care” that the laws are faithfully executed and rely on implicit “general authority provided
by the Clean Air Act,” as legal grounds for entering executive agreements relating to climate
change.113 This approach is probably not well-supported, however. As noted earlier, the extent
to which the “take care” clause authorizes entrance into and domestic enforcement of executive
agreements is controversial and uncertain – particularly where the President relies on generallyworded, implicit authorizations. A more legally sound approach would rely on any implicit
authorization from the Clean Air Act as mere ancillary authority for executive agreements that
rest on other more sound legal bases.
109
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Although beyond the present scope of this paper, it seems likely that the Clean Air Act’s
coverage of greenhouse gases also does not provide authority for the President to internationally
commit to binding emissions targets that would be achievable by the EPA under its existing
Clean Air Act authority. Where the EPA itself has not yet promulgated regulations that produce
emissions targets, the President’s binding international commitment that the EPA will effectuate
some specified target may impermissibly overstep the agency’s mandate. This view may differ
depending on whether one subscribes to a presidentialist theory of administration that
understands the President to be in full control of administrative activity114 or to a view that resists
presidential control of agency rulemakings.115 The more legally safe view in this case, however,
should acknowledge the lack of congressional authorization for such presidential action and the
general deference shown to an agency’s broad rulemaking discretion116 as reasons for concluding
that the President probably cannot internationally bind the EPA in advance of the EPA’s own
rulemaking on an emissions reduction target.
B. Science and Technology Cooperation
Cooperation agreements in science and technology research and development tend to be
bilateral. Many agreements with the same country are usually made pursuant to a single
umbrella agreement, itself an executive agreement, that establishes general principles for the
cooperative relationship. Two key congressional authorizations regarding international scientific
cooperation may explain the multiplicity of executive agreements in this area.
The 1979 Foreign Relations Authorization Act directs the President to “assess and initiate
appropriate international scientific and technological activities which are based upon domestic
scientific and technological activities of the United States Government and which are beneficial
to the United States and foreign countries,” and charges the Secretary of State with coordination
and oversight of international science and technology agreements.117 The 1979 International
Development Cooperation Act also authorizes the President to establish an Institute for Scientific
and Technological Cooperation, which is subject to the foreign policy guidance of the Secretary
of State and whose task is “to assist developing countries to strengthen their own scientific and
technological capacity.”118 To carry out the purposes of the Institute, the President is directed to
“make and perform contracts and other agreements with any individual, institution, . . . and with
governments or government agencies, domestic or foreign.”119 These broad statutory
authorizations would likely apply to cooperative research relating to adaptation and renewable
energy technology, among other potentially relevant areas.
A 1988 umbrella agreement with Japan on cooperation in research and development in
science and technology cited the legislative delegation in the Foreign Relations Authorization
Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2656d, along with the “President’s constitutional powers,” as its legal authority.
The agreement established a “policy framework” for the cooperative relationship, a management
mechanism to oversee cooperation, and provided for the conclusion of future “implementing
114
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arrangements” under the Agreement “to determine the specific terms of cooperation.”120 The
agreement identified global environment and joint database development as areas for cooperation
and information exchange as a form of cooperation.121 More than fifteen executive agreements
have been entered pursuant to this umbrella agreement.122
Another example of an umbrella agreement on scientific cooperation – this one not citing
any legal authority, only noting the President’s joint communiqué on the establishment of
diplomatic relations with China – is one between U.S. and China, signed and entered into force
on January 31, 1979. The agreement states broad principles of cooperation, establishes a U.S.China Joint Commission on Scientific and Technological Cooperation, and provides for
“[s]pecific accords implementing this Agreement [that] may cover the subjects of cooperation,
procedures to be followed, treatment of intellectual property, funding, and other appropriate
matters.”123 A whole host of executive agreements have been implemented under this
agreement, including a protocol between the Commerce Department and its Chinese counterpart
on cooperation in the fields of metrology and standards,”124 a protocol between the Department
of Energy and its Chinese counterpart for cooperation in the fields of energy efficiency and
renewable energy technology development and utilization,125 and a protocol signed by the U.S.
Geological Survey, the National Science Foundation, and the National Institute of Standards and
Technology for cooperation on earthquake and volcano sciences.126
As these agreements show, the congressional delegations in the Foreign Relations
Authorization and International Development Cooperation Acts, along with the President’s
independent foreign affairs powers, are grounds for an extensive network of agreements in
science and technology cooperation. The umbrella agreements, pursuant to which many later
agreements are entered, are broadly-worded and provide for implementing arrangements in a
wide range of research areas involving an array of federal agencies. This practice leaves little
doubt that the President can enter an executive agreement for cooperation in science and
technology in climate change negotiations, whether pursuant to existing bilateral agreements or
as a new agreement delineating areas for future cooperation and information exchange. Such
agreements may be imperative for cooperative research on carbon capture and sequestration127
and geo-engineering, for instance.
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C. Development Assistance
As explained above, the President may not usurp Congress’s unique spending power by
legally binding the United States to the commitment of funds.128 As a result, many executive
agreements provide that activities under the agreement are contingent upon available funding. In
many instances, such a contingency does not necessarily diminish the impact of the agreement,
which may, as we have seen, establish commissions, announce general principles for future
arrangements, and otherwise set forth policies that need no funding to take effect. Where the
agreements are solely about funding, of course, the constitutional constraint on the President’s
power requires collaboration with Congress to implement the agreement.
In this context, it is worth noting several provisions of the International Development and
Food Assistance Act of 1977 that confer upon the President authority highly relevant to the
climate change negotiations, but which will likely require funding to take effect. For instance,
Congress has authorized the President “to furnish assistance . . . for developing and
strengthening the capacity of developing countries to protect and manage their environment and
natural resources.”129 The President is also authorized to “utilize the resources and abilities of all
relevant [federal] agencies” in providing assistance to developing countries to:
“support training programs, . . . and the establishment or strengthening of
institutions which increase the capacity of developing countries to formulate
forest policies [and] engage in relevant land-use planning,” and to “support
training, research, and other actions which lead to sustainable and more
environmentally sound practices for timber harvesting . . . including reforestation,
soil conservation, and other activities to rehabilitate degraded forest lands.”130
On the subject of energy resources, Congress delegated to the President authority to furnish
assistance, including data collection and analysis, training, and research and development, “on
such terms and conditions as he may determine, to enable [developing] countries” to develop
their energy resources.131 The President is further authorized to furnish assistance “for
cooperative programs with developing countries in energy production and conservation, through
research on and development and use of . . . renewable energy sources for rural areas,” training,
institutional development, and scientific exchange.132
These provisions relating to natural resources, reforestation, energy conservation, and
renewable energy, and authorizing assistance to build capacity, strengthen institutions, and
engage in scientific exchange are broadly-worded and may well authorize a wide range of ex
ante congressional-executive agreements relevant to the climate change context. Although these
executive agreements will be internationally binding, they are likely non-self-executing and
subject to the availability of future congressional appropriations. Without the support of
Congress and some certainty of funding, the President’s authority under these provisions,
although potentially quite broad, may have limited meaning in international negotiations.133
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130
131
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See supra Part I.C.
22 U.S.C. § 2151p(b).
Id. § 2151p-1(c)
Id. § 2151d(b)(1).
Id. § 2151d(b)(2).
Congress’s spending power aside, the Secretary of the Treasury is authorized by statute to designate officials
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D. Other Possible Authorizations and Considerations
This section makes a few observations that may guide decisions on whether and how to
enter into executive climate change agreements. First, framework or umbrella agreements
appear to be a common form for executive agreements, as evidenced in the discussion of
scientific and technological cooperation agreements. This may reflect a presumption that the
President’s broad executive powers as “sole organ” of the nation allow him to paint with broad
strokes the foreign policy of a particular area.
One notable example is a 1987 agreement with Iraq on commercial, economic, and
technical cooperation. The State Department explanation accompanying the agreement describes
the agreement as a “broad, non-specific ‘umbrella’ agreement which can be the basis for
additional agreements” and further explains that the agreement “does not commit either side to
specific actions but provides a structure for commercial contacts between entities within the two
countries.”134 For authority, the agreement simply cited (1) the President’s Article II powers and
(2) the Department of Commerce’s statutory authority under 15 U.S.C. 1512,135 which merely
states that “it is the province and duty of [the Department of Commerce] to foster, promote, and
develop the foreign and domestic commerce . . . of the United States.”136
Second, most, perhaps all, executive agreements limit the agreement’s life, typically to
five years, with provisions for renewal thereafter. Although this self-limitation does not arise
from any constitutional directive, the practice appears to be uniform and may arise in part from a
notion that a “temporary” agreement is a more limited, and hence more acceptable, use of
presidential power. Interestingly, many of these agreements provide that expiration or
termination does not affect the implementation of projects or programs undertaken pursuant to
the agreement.137
Third, the Endangered Species Act authorizes the Secretary of State to “encourage the
entering into of bilateral or multilateral agreements with foreign countries to provide for” the
conservation of listed species.”138 Although it is not clear how far this actually authorizes
executive agreements, it may be helpful to support evidence of congressional acquiescence in
international agreements that address the protection of endangered and threatened species.139
Finally, although far from obvious, the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”)
may provide ancillary support for some executive climate change agreements. In an executive
agreement with Canada concluded to regulate transboundary movement of hazardous waste
within the Treasury Department to “disburse public money available for expenditure by an executive agency.” 31
U.S.C. § 3321(a). Moreover, where an appropriation is “available for obligation for a definite period” to an
executive agency, the President is authorized by statute to apportion the funds by time period or activity. Id. §§
1512-13. It is possible, then, that depending on how future climate change legislation is worded, the President,
through the Secretary of the Treasury, may have authority to apportion and disburse funds generated in a domestic
emissions trading system, including possibly disbursing those funds in executive agreements.
134
Commercial, economic, and technical cooperation agreement, U.S.-Iraq, Aug. 26, 1987, T.I.A.S. No. 12020.
The Oceana database shows no later agreements entered pursuant to this one.
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Id.
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15 U.S.C. 1512.
137
E.g., Agreement on Cooperation in Research and Development in Science and Technology Arts. IX, X, U.S.Japan, June 20, 1988, T.I.A.S. No. 12025.
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Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1537(b)(2).
139
More than 500 species living in foreign countries are listed by the Endangered Species Act as endangered or
threatened. Some of these will surely be detrimentally affected by climate change. See Fish & Wildlife Service,
Species Report, at http://ecos.fws.gov/tess_public/SpeciesReport.do?lead=10&listingType=L.
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pursuant to the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (“RCRA“), the legal authority cited for
concluding the agreement, aside from RCRA itself, was: (1) the President’s constitutional power
“to conduct foreign regulations,” (2) the Secretary of State’s statutory authority to manage
foreign affairs under 22 U.S.C. 2656,140 and (3) NEPA, in particular its provision directing all
federal agencies to:
“recognize the worldwide and long-range character of environmental problems
and, where consistent with the foreign policy of the United States, [to] lend
support to initiatives, resolutions, and programs designed to maximize
international cooperation in anticipating and preventing a decline in the quality of
mankind’s world environment.”141
The strength of this provision as ex ante authorizing legislation is questionable due to its
vagueness, but it is nevertheless worth noting as ancillary evidence of congressional
acquiescence in “international cooperation” for GHG emissions mitigation.
V. Conclusion
Subject to political considerations, the President can probably submit any climate
agreement reached at Copenhagen and beyond as an ex post congressional-executive agreement
for majority vote of both houses of Congress, rather than as an Article II treaty. The possibility
of political backlash if a comprehensive climate agreement is submitted outside of the Article II
process, however, invites exploration of other avenues to move the ball forward.
The President’s foreign affairs powers are the starting point. The broad executive power,
and the related power as sole organ of communications in foreign relations are relevant and
persuasive authority for action in areas where the exchange of information is important. In
addition to these inherent constitutional powers, the President may also rely on the UNFCCC and
the Convention on International Civil Aviation; congressional delegations relating to science and
technology cooperation and assistance to developing countries; and ancillary support from the
Clean Air Act, the Endangered Species Act, and the National Environmental Policy Act, as legal
authority for entering into a variety of executive agreements. Some of these agreements may
need funding to become implemented, while others will be self-executing pursuant to the Clean
Air Act and the Energy Policy Act.
Together, this suite of legal support may sustain executive agreements relating to MRV
and information sharing, aviation emissions, cooperation in research and development, and
capacity-building for developing countries. This survey identifies some of the key areas most
relevant to climate negotiations and is by no means comprehensive, or intended to present treaty
executive and ex ante congressional-executive agreements as the sole or ideal means of making
international commitments in climate change. In light of the potential difficulty of getting an
international climate agreement approved under the Article II process, however, these avenues
for making binding international commitments may be helpful as interim or supplemental
measures demonstrating U.S. willingness to take action in the climate change arena.
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